Growing widespread outages in power systems caused by natural disasters have highlighted the necessity of applying defensive approaches with the goal of prompt service restoration. In this context, this paper proposes a stochastic model with the goal of optimally using proactive operational actions before the upcoming disturbance hits. The actions considered in this study include network reconfiguration and crew prepositioning. To take the effective actions, the model simulates probable damages caused by the events via a set of scenarios generated by Monte Carlo simulation method. The proposed model aims at minimizing the expected load curtailment caused by the event over the scenarios. To calculate the amount of load curtailments, potential post-disturbance actions are also considered in the model. The model is mathematically formulated in mixed integer linear programming (MILP) fashion which can be easily solved via available software packages. A standard distribution system with a realistic set of data is employed to validate the effectiveness of the proposed model.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, natural calamities have significantly affected the electricity supply continuity all over the world [1] . As an example, hurricane sandy after hitting the eastern shore of the United States left nearly 7.5 million customers without electricity [2] , [3] . Hence, boosting the resilience of power systems to deal with such events has been highlighted more than before. Due to the fact that power distribution systems are the most vulnerable part of power systems, more attention ought to be devoted to this sector of power systems [4] . The word ''resilience'' meaning the ''act of rebounding'' stems from the Latin word ''resilire,'' which means ''the ability to spring back or rebound'' [5] . According to [6] , resilience engineering ''uses the insights from research on failures in complex systems, including organizational contributors to risk, and the factors that affect human performance to provide systems engineering tools to manage risks proactively.'' Furthermore, a comprehensive definition for the infrastructure resilience is offered by the National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC) as ''the ability to reduce the magnitude and/or duration of disruptive events. The effectiveness of a resilient infrastructure or enterprise depends upon its ability to anticipate, absorb, adapt to, and/or rapidly recover from a potentially disruptive event'' [7] . Also, according to the UK Energy Research Center, resilience is ''the capacity of an energy system to tolerate disturbance and to continue to deliver affordable energy services to consumers. A resilient energy system can speedily recover from shocks and can provide alternative means of satisfying energy service needs in the event of changed external circumstances'' [8] . According to Presidential Policy Directive 21, resilience is ''the ability to prepare for and adapt to changing conditions and withstand and recover rapidly from disruption'' [9] . Accordingly, contemplating all the aforementioned definitions, a resilient system should comprise the following characteristics: avoidance, survival, and recovery. In the literature, improving resilience of power distribution systems to cope with disastrous events has been studied from distinctive perceptions. Also, various metrics such as availability-based metrics for evaluating resilience engineering have been studied in the literature [10] , wherein using the introduced metric, a new dynamic-Bayesian-network-based methodology has been proposed for evaluating the resilience value of engineering systems.
In some studies, hardening of distribution system components has been proposed to deal with natural hazards [11] - [13] . The study reported in [13] , has proposed a two-stage stochastic MILP model to design a resilient distribution system. The first stage involves deploying resilience-oriented design of resources (e.g., automatic switches and back-up distributed generations (DGs)) and hardening distribution lines. In the second stage, system operation cost during the extreme weather event is evaluated [14] , [15] . Also, a new metric for resilience measure has been introduced in [16] thereby a comprehensive approach for resilient system design under internal deterioration and external distress has been proposed. Then, by using a combinatorial analysis, the relationship between system resilience and the damage is attained. Although infrastructure hardening could boost the strength of power distribution systems in dealing with disastrous events, they call for considerable investments from utility companies. Some other studies have proposed operational strategies to enhance power distribution resilience. In some studies, it has been proposed to divide distribution networks into self-sufficient microgrids after the occurrence of the event [17] - [19] . Authors in [19] have proposed a multi-microgrid formation after the occurrence of a major fault due to a natural disaster with the aid of available remote controlled switches (RCSs) and DGs to pick up critical loads. The proposed method was formulated as a MILP problem. In [20] , a MILP model has been proposed for post-fault multi-time step service restoration under cold load pickup conditions in presence of RCSs, DGs, and energy storage (ESs) systems. In [21] , a two-stage stochastic model has been proposed for resilience enhancement of power distribution systems via taking advantages of mobile ESs.
Furthermore, considering load balancing as a constraint in the study, [22] has proposed a reinforcement learningoriented (i.e., wolf pack algorithm) agent-based restoration strategy for smart grids. Besides the reviewed works, some studies have emphasized preventive actions that should be adopted prior to the occurrence of approaching disastrous events [23] - [26] . Authors in [23] have accomplished robust pre-disturbance scheduling of microgrids with the aim of minimizing the cost of high impact low probability events by the implementation of column-and-constraint generation (C&CG) algorithm. The study in [27] has presented a new algorithm to find the number and location of depots at the pre-disturbance stage to manage the available resources right after stricken of the event. The authors in [28] have offered a two-stage stochastic model to minimize restoration costs via allocating available distributed energy resources proactively in advance of a hurricane. Also, pre-positioning and real-time allocation of mobile emergency generators have been studied in [29] and [30] . Authors in [31] and [32] have presented proactive scheduling for distribution networks by identifying vulnerable lines and tripping them out intentionally prior to the occurrence of approaching extreme weather events. The repair procedure of damaged components after the occurrence of a catastrophic event has been studied in [33] , [34] . Since repair actions are usually time expensive, advantages of available sources, RCSs, and manual switches (MSs) were taken before starting the repair process.
In order to move toward more resilient systems, this paper proposes a model to optimally employ available resources in dealing with predictable natural disasters. In this regard, the model reconfigures the network to obtain a more resilient configuration considering the likely consequences of the upcoming disturbance. In addition, to expedite the expected post-disturbance actions, available maneuver crew teams are prepositioned in proper locations. Needless to mention, taking the proper decisions associated with network reconfiguration and crew prepositioning calls for simulating likely consequences of the approaching event. To do so, the Monte Carlo simulation method is employed for generating likely damage scenarios using the failure probability of power distribution lines extracted from fragility curves [35] . The proposed model is to minimize the expected load curtailment caused by the event over the scenarios. To calculate the amount of load curtailments, potential post-disturbance actions are also considered in the model. Needless to mention, contemplating all the scenarios, the model makes a unique decision for all pre-disturbance actions. The model is mathematically formulated in mixed integer linear programming (MILP) fashion which can be easily solved via available software packages. The proposed model is applied to a test bed, and the simulation results reveal its significant performance.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the problem description and methodology. Section III describes the mathematical formulation of the proposed model. The case study and simulation results are presented in Section IV. Section V concludes the study.
II. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION AND METHODOLOGY
In many occasions, disturbances cannot be predicted in advance. An earthquake is an example of such disturbances. Needless to mention, it is inevitable to focus on the optimal scheduling of post-disturbance actions in dealing with such disturbances. There are however some disturbances such as severe weather conditions, floods, and thunderstorms which can be predicted in advance. In these occasions, it makes sense to focus on both pre-disturbance and post-disturbance actions to mitigate the consequences of the event. To do so, this paper proposes a model to optimize the schedule of pre-disturbance actions. There are a variety of actions a system operator can take before an event. The proposed model however mainly focuses on network reconfiguration and crew prepositioning. Synonymously, the model aims at extracting the best possible configuration of the network prior to the approaching disturbance and prepositioning crew teams for speeding up likely post-disturbance operations. It is clear that likely damages of the upcoming event have a stochastic nature. So, the model is a stochastic one wherein uncertainty associated with potential damages is captured via a set of likely scenarios. Here, a scenario represents the operating status of network lines during and after the event. In order to sample damage scenarios, fragility curves of power distribution lines are used in this paper. The fragility curves together with the severity of the approaching event are employed to determine the failure probability of lines under disturbance excitation. Interested readers are referred to [24] , [31] , [32] , [36] where estimating failure probability of system components based on the intensity of natural disasters and their fragility curves have been extensively discussed. Also, using dynamic Bayesian networks in the study, [37] has proposed a new hybrid physics-model-based and data-driven methodology for remaining useful life estimation of structure systems, wherein the value of remaining useful life can be updated using the expert knowledge or sensor data as input values to the estimation model. Failure probabilities of the lines are fed to the Monte Carlo simulation method as input data to generate likely scenarios. It is worthwhile to note that the accuracy of the results increases as the number of generated scenarios grows. However, computational complexity is a barrier which forces scenario-based stochastic models to establish a tradeoff between accuracy and complexity. To alleviate concerns on computational complexity, a scenario reduction approach is implemented in this paper. To ensure that the reduced number of scenarios does not jeopardize the accuracy of the final results, solution stability test is applied here.
Considering the mentioned assumptions and methods, the model is formulated in the next section to minimize the expected load curtailment induced by the disturbance over all generated scenarios. To adhere network operational constraints, power flow equations are considered in the model. To keep the model simple enough to be solved in available software packages, it is developed in MILP fashion.
The model is fed by network technical data, geographical information of the system components like manual switches, crew teams, and fault locations, and the time the disturbance hits and line damages occur in different scenarios as input data. It then provides an optimal schedule of actions before the disturbance hits the system. It is expected that using the proposed model, not only less load curtailment is caused by a disastrous event but also due to the prepositioned crews, curtailed loads can be restored promptly.
III. MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION
As mentioned before, system operator optimizes system resources once disturbance consequences are forecasted and the set of likely scenarios for post-disturbance system status are generated. This can be done via solving an optimization problem with the aim to minimize the expected postdisturbance load curtailment over all scenarios considering their priorities as follows.
According to the above relation, different priorities can be considered for loads hosted by different buses. It is worthwhile to note that though different objectives like system operation cost and crew fuel cost can be considered too, it does not make a big deal to slightly increase network losses to enhance system resilience in dealing with low probability events. This objective is subject to some technical constraints which are described here. Active and reactive power balance equations at each bus in each time period are as follows.
The following expressions adhere to the power flow equations.
The expressions addressed in (4) and (5) are based on the linear AC power flow model proposed in [38] , i.e., Dist-Flow model. It is worthwhile to mention that the model has been successfully applied in several articles [38] - [40] . In the model, the constraints can be relaxed via the big-M method if the associated line is in open state [32] .
In the following, (6) is to guarantee that capacity limit of lines is considered. (7) implies that the voltage magnitude at all buses is within the allowed range. Similarly, (8) guarantees that capacity limit of the substation is considered.
To preserve linearity of the model, (8) is linearized using the special-ordered-sets-of-type 2 (SOS2) method presented in [41] . The set of constraints in (9)-(12) model the limits on the output power of DGs, PVs, and WTs, respectively. Note that the PVs and WTs are assumed to be P-Q sources with a constant power factor. Needless to mention, the limit of PVs and WTs is a time-varying parameter depending on environmental parameters such as wind speed and solar irradiation.
The set of constraints in (13)−(15) are considered to ensure the radial configuration of the network. These constraints are borrowed from the spanning tree method explained in [42] . 
γ 1,n,t = 0, ∀n ∈ ψ root , t = EP
The following constraint is to limit the number of times that the status of a switch is changed.
In the above expression, t,l takes 1 if the status of the associated switch is changed at time t. The changes in the status are detected via the following expressions.
The arrival time of crews to the location of point j is calculated in (19) and (20) as follows.
In the above expressions, the arrival time to point j is equal to the arrival time to point i, the time needed for traveling between the two points, and the time needed for changing the status of the switch at point i. The big-M method is used to exclude the constraints associated with the paths which are not traveled by the crew teams [33] .
The following constraints are considered to model the logical actions taken by crew teams.
i Disp cr dp,i = 1, ∀cr 
In the above, (21) guarantees that a crew team is dispatched to a switch location only if changing status of the switch is required. (22) implies that each crew is initially dispatched from the depot. The set of constraints (23)- (25) ensure that all crew teams are finally at one of the staging locations before the approaching disturbance hits. (26) indicates that a crew leaves a switch location only after changing the status of the switch. (27) implies that only one crew can be dispatched to the location of each switch. (28) , (29) , and (30) are used for determining the time when the status of a switch changes. (31) guarantees that a crew team can leave point i only if they have been previously dispatched to the location. (32) indicates that crew teams must not be dispatched to the location of RCSs since their status can be changed remotely.
The actions taken by the system operator before the event are directly related to the event predictability (EP). In other words, the operator may take several actions if there is enough time and may take just some high priority actions if the time to event is tight. This time limit for RCSs is mathematically formulated as follows.
The above-mentioned expressions are related to actions taken in the pre-disturbance situation. Here, formulations related to actions after the disturbance are expressed in detail. To avoid unnecessary repetition, equations (7) − (21), (26) − (32) are lumped in (35) where t is substituted by t , and the equations are written for all scenarios (s). 
In the above, (36) and (37) assure the active and reactive power balance at each bus, respectively. It is worthwhile to note that difference between the power balance equations before and after the event goes back to the fact that load curtailment might be inevitable after the event. (38) ensures that load curtailment in each bus does not exceed the total load connected to that bus. (39) is to ensure that the power factor of the load remains the same after the load curtailment. (40) indicates the status of network lines after the event hits the system. (41) and (42) 
Equations presented in (44) and (45) represent the time needed for crew teams to take the j th action. (46) guarantees that once the event is finished, crews start their travel from the staging locations where they moved to before the occurrence of the hazard. In addition, (47) is considered for coupling the status of switches in pre-and post-disturbance stages. (48) indicates that once a crew team moves to the location of a switch, the status of the switch should be changed. Finally, (49) guarantees that in each scenario, all of the crew teams should be moved to the depot location after performing the scheduled actions. 
The set of constraints in (50) − (52) guarantee the radial configuration of the network in the post-disturbance stage. pγ s,m,n,t +pγ s,n,m,t = ϑ s t ,l , ∀s, t , l ∈ (m, n) , n ∈ ψ m (50) n∈ψ m pγ s,m,n,t ≤ 1, ∀s, m, t , n ∈ ψ m (51) pγ s,1,n,t = 0, ∀s, t , n ∈ ψ root (52)
The scheduling problem established in the above is in MILP format that can be solved using commercial software packages. The optimal decisions from this optimization problem comprise the pre-disturbance configuration of the system, switching sequence of the switches, the output power of available sources, and prepositioned locations of the crew teams. It should be noted that the developed MILP model is solved by the CPLEX solver in GAMS environment. It is worthwhile to mention that the solver uses a Branch and Bound algorithm (with cuts) and supports specially ordered set variables SOS1, SOS2 as well as semi-continuous and semi-integer variables [43] . The algorithm is an enumerative method which solves MILP problems by relaxing the constraints and using the state-space search. Interested readers are referred to [44] wherein the method is investigated in more details.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
The proposed model is implemented on a 47-bus power distribution system with a realistic set of data as shown in Fig. 1 . Parameters of the network are taken from [45] . Fig. 2 illustrates the load profile of the test system. Five dispatchable DGs are considered in the system. The data related to these units are given in Table 1 . In addition, a PV unit is hosted by Bus 20. Moreover, three WT units are assumed to be installed at Buses 26, 33, and 37. The output powers of the PVs and WTs during a typical day are shown in Figs. 3 and 4 , respectively [45] . As can be seen in Fig. 1 , two RCSs are installed on Lines 26 and 43. It is assumed that the event happens at 1 PM. It should be noted that the time step (i.e., t ) is considered to be 5 minutes in the studies. According to the historical data, mainly the occurrence of natural calamities deteriorates traffic congestion problems [46] . These problems mainly occur as a consequence of the severity of the event, which can lead to unexpected broken roads obstructed by external objects like broken trees and damaged cars. In addition, during the extreme events, some people incline to evacuate the cities, which can give rise to extensive traffic congestion for a long period of time like three days in some cases [46] . Therefore, in order to consider the traffic issues after the occurrence of the event and likely congestions, traffic congestion factor (TCF) is defined as an emergency condition traveling time over the normal condition traveling time. In this study, it is assumed that the value of TCF is set equal to two. It is also assumed that two crew teams are available in the system where a depot and two staging locations are considered as can be observed in Fig. 1 .
To capture uncertainties associated with line damages caused by the event, 1000 random scenarios are firstly generated via the Monte Carlo simulation algorithm. Then, the SCENRED toolbox of the general algebraic modeling system (GAMS) is used to reduce the number of scenarios to 20 [47] . Table 2 provides reduced scenarios and their associated probabilities. Moreover, the data required for calculating the traveling time of crew teams between different points are given in Table 3 , which are taken from Google Maps [48] . It is worthwhile to mention that the time required for changing the status of a switch is assumed to be 5 minutes. The simulations are executed on a PC with Intel Core i5 CPU @3.40 GHz and 8 GB RAM. The proposed model is solved in the GAMS environment with zero optimality gap. It should be noted that all of the simulations take less than the 3 minutes, which indicates the efficiency of the calculation. To examine the performance of the proposed model, it is assumed that the approaching event is predicted 45 minutes before it hits the system. With this assumption, pre-disturbance scheduling of the crew teams after running the proposed model is given in Table 4 . In addition, the schematic illustration of crew dispatching to the switch locations is shown in Fig. 5 . As can be seen, as the first action, Crew 1 travels from depot location to the location of SW4 and then opens the switch with the total time of 15 minutes (i.e., 10 minutes for travel time and 5 minutes for changing the status of the switch). After accomplishing this action, the crew moves to the location of SW1 in order to close the switch, which takes 30 minutes. Simultaneously, the second crew moves from depot to the location of SW2 to close it. This action takes 25 minutes. Crews 1 and 2 are then dispatched to the staging locations 2 and 1 prior to the approaching disaster, respectively. Finally, the switch of line 25-27 is opened remotely after 40 minutes. Needless to mention, these actions are taken considering the tough time limits (i.e., 45 minutes period).
A. CASE I
In this case, it is assumed that Scenario 5 happens after the occurrence of the event. This scenario is discussed since it is the best among all simulated scenarios. The line damages caused by the disturbance in this scenario are depicted in Fig. 6 . Considering the damages, there are no required switching actions in the post-disturbance stage in this scenario. However, if the proactive actions are not employed, the actions itemized in Table 5 are required to be applied after the disturbance to restore the system. The actions are graphically depicted in Fig. 6 too. As can be seen, after the occurrence of the disturbance, in order to restore the curtailed loads, Crew 1 moves to the location of SW2 and closes it, which takes 45 minutes. Then, the crew moves toward the depot. Fig. 7 compares the amount of load curtailments during Scenario 1 for the two simulated situations with and without taking pre-disturbance actions. As can be seen, after the occurrence of the disturbance, supplied load level of the system falls down to 85% when the pre-disturbance actions are not applied. The level rises to 96.78% after 45 minutes. However, the total supplied load level falls down to 96.78% if the scheduled actions are applied before the disturbance hits the system. In addition, the curtailed energy without taking the pre-disturbance scheduling is 3.105 MWh within the first hour after the disturbance. This index, in the presence of pre-disturbance scheduling, is equal to 1.08 MWh. This demonstrates the great potential of the proposed model in scheduling pre-disturbance actions. Hence, considering the acquired results, the proposed proactive scheduling approach has noticeably enhanced the resilience level of the system.
B. CASE II
In this case, it is assumed that Scenario 18 takes place. This scenario is discussed since it is the worst among all simulated scenarios. The line damages caused by the disturbance in this scenario are depicted in Fig. 8 . Considering the damaged lines and pre-disturbance actions describe earlier, the actions given in Table 6 are required to be conducted after the disturbance. As can be observed in Fig. 8 , applying the scheduled proactive actions, the crew teams require only one switching action to take. In this regard, Crew 1 moves from S2 to the location of SW3 and closes it within 35 minutes. Then, both of the crews move to the depot location. However, the crew teams have to take actions presented in Table 7 if no proactive action is considered. The actions are pictorially depicted in Fig. 9 as well. As can be seen, Crew 1 is dispatched from depot to the location of SW2, which takes 45 minutes. The crew is then dispatched to close SW3. This action takes 70 minutes. Meanwhile, the second crew is dispatched to the location of SW1 to close it, which takes 35 minutes. The profiles of load curtailments during Scenario 2 with and without taking pre-disturbance actions are compared in Fig. 10 . As can be observed, in the presence of the pre-disturbance actions, the system experiences less interruptions compared to the situation where no proactive action is carried out. In addition, the total energy curtailment within two hours after the occurrence of the disturbance is equal to 16.217 if no proactive action is applied. This index is declined to 11.18 MWh if the scheduled proactive actions are performed. Therefore, implementing the proposed optimization scheme, the system operators not only have alleviated the initial load curtailment of the system but also recovered the system more quickly. Accordingly, the model mitigates the repercussions of the upcoming natural calamity effectively.
C. CASE III
In this case, Scenario 17 is considered for implementing sensitivity analyses on some key affecting parameters. This scenario is selected since it is the most likely scenario among all simulated scenarios. Table 8 presents the required post-disturbance actions if the scheduled pre-disturbance actions are performed. As can be seen, in this scenario, Crew 1 is dispatched to close SW3 first. It moves to the depot location thereafter. Since there is no additional action to do, Crew 2 directly moves to the depot location. Note that, in this case, after the event hits, 87.8% of the total load is supplied. The amount of supplied load rises to 96.8% after closing SW3. In order to investigate the impact of key parameters on the performance of the proposed model, three sensitivity analyses are conducted here. Note that these analyses are conducted on Case III. At first, a sensitivity analysis is conducted to investigate the impact of the EP on the amount of curtailed load after the occurrence of the event. To do so, different values for EP are considered and actions taken by the crew teams before and after the disturbance are given in Table 9 . In addition, the amount of supplied load after the disturbance hits is shown in Fig 11. As can be seen, predictability of the approaching event has a drastic impact on the amount of curtailed load in the system. It stands to reason that the system operator is able to better schedule the resources and take more actions as there is more time before the disturbance hits the system. As another observation, the amount of load at a particular moment after the event is not necessarily less for smaller EP values. This is mainly due to the different weight factors at different load points as well as the fact that the objective aims at minimizing the weighted energy interruption during the whole time. In summary, the amount of weighted energy interruption caused by the event decreases as the system operator has more time before the disturbance hits the system.
The impact of the number of available crew teams on the service restoration of the system is scrutinized here. The value of EP is set to 50 minutes in the analysis. The analysis is performed and the achieved results are provided in Table 10 . It is worthwhile to note that the amount of curtailed energy provided in the table is calculated for the period until 2 hours after the disturbance. As can be seen, without exerting the proactive actions, altering the number of crew teams does not affect the amount of load survived after the occurrence of the disturbance. However, increasing the number of crew teams significantly declines the amount of curtailed energy in the system. On the other hand, implementing the proposed TABLE 9. Crew actions before and after the event for different EP values. FIGURE 11. The restoration process of the system load after the event versus EP. model to schedule proactive actions, by increasing the number of crew teams, the system operator not only acquires a more robust configuration which leads to more supplied load TABLE 10. Impact of the number of crew teams on the initial load curtailment and restoration process of the system. level after the disturbance, but also, he/she can recover the system from the devastated state quickly, which gives rise to less energy curtailment and customer interruption. Also, another sensitivity analysis is conducted on the value of TCF in order to investigate the effect of traffic congestion on the restoration process after the disturbance hits. To do so, the amount of curtailed energy within 5 hours after the occurrence of the disturbance is calculated by increasing the value of TCF in both strategies (i.e., with and without proactive actions), while considering the different numbers of crew teams. As can be observed in Fig. 12 , the value of TCF significantly affects the amount of curtailed energy. Especially, without implementing the proactive actions, since all the actions take place after the disturbance, increasing the TCF value has a drastic impact on the curtailed energy. Accordingly, in case a natural calamity induces a prevalent impact on the transportation system (e.g., floods), the importance and motivation of implementing the proposed model to schedule appropriate proactive actions are even more. Finally, to analyze whether the set of reduced scenarios is capable of covering the associated uncertainties, solution stability test is applied to the problem. As can be seen in Fig. 13 , regarding 20 scenarios, the solution is stable.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a stochastic model was developed to enhance power distribution system resilience against predictable natural hazards. In the model, system resources are optimally scheduled in pre-and post-disturbance stages. In this model, the system is optimally reconfigured via taking advantage of available resources (e.g., DGs, WTs, and PVs), RCSs, and dispatching the crew teams to MS locations. The optimal placement of available crew teams in advance of the approaching disturbance is also considered in the model. To do so, the likely restoration processes of the system in the post-disturbance is simulated and a unique decision has been made. In order to capture the uncertain behavior of disturbances, several scenarios were sampled via Monte Carlo simulation technique for damage state of distribution lines. The scenarios are then reduced via SCENRED toolbox in GAMS to achieve a problem with affordable computational complexity. The performance of the proposed model was demonstrated by conducting different analyses on a typical distribution system. The achieved results indicate that predictability of the event and number of available crew teams have significant impacts on service restoration after the disastrous event hits the system.
